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THE NEW YORK RULE IN REGARD TO
LESSER DEGREES OF CRIME
was a well established rule of the common law that a
defendant, accused of the commission of a crime, might
properly be convicted of the crime charged in the indictment or of any lesser offense constituted by the acts set forth
in the indictment and proven upon the trial." Though the
evidence fail to support every allegation of the indictment,
proof of such of the acts averred as would constitute a lesser
offense would justify a conviction for the lesser crime and
the unproved allegations of the indictment would be treated
as mere surplusage. This rule was subject, however, to an
important exception, in that upon an indictment for a felony
no conviction could be had for a misdemeanor, as certain
privileges afforded the accused charged with a misdemeanor
2
were not available upon trial for a felony.
The codification of the criminal law in New York has
embodied this common law rule, but its statutory expression I
T

'People v. White, 22 Wend. 167 (N. Y. 1839); People v. Jackson, 3 Hill
92 (N. Y. 1842) ; People v. McDonald, 49 Hun 47, 1 N. Y. Supp. 703 (5th
Dept. 1888).
2 The privileges of a defendant on trial for a misdemeanor not available
upon a trial for a felony included the right to appear by counsel, to have a
copy of the indictment and a special jury. This exception did not prevail in
New York. People v. White, 22 Wend. 167 (N. Y. 1839) ; People v. Jackson,
3 Hill 92 (N. Y. 1842), supra note 1; Dedieu v. People, 22 N. Y. 180 (1860),
infra note 4.

IN. Y.

PENAL LAw § 610 provides:
"Upon the trial of an indictment, the prisoner may be convicted of
the crime charged therein, or of a lesser degree of the same crime, or of
an attempt to commit the crime so charged, or of an attempt to commit
a lesser degree of the same crime."

N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 444 provides:
"Upon an indictment for a crime consisting of different degrees, the
jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree charged in the
indictment, and guilty of any degree inferior thereto, or of an attempt to
commit the crime. Upon a trial for murder or manslaughter, if the
act complained of is not proven to be the cause of death, the defendant
may be convicted of assault in any degree constituted by said act, and
warranted by the evidence. A conviction upon a charge of assault is
not a bar to the subsequent prosecution for manslaughter or murder, if
the person assaulted dies after conviction, in case death results from the
injury caused by'the assault."
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is couched in language which has suffered conflicting interpretations, made its proper application difficult, and has furnished a popular ground for appeals by convicted defendants
even to the present day.
The primary source of confusion sprang from the limitation of the rule, by the wording of the first statute, to "crimes
consisting of different degrees". Early in the case history of
this subject it was contended that upon prosecutions for
crimes divided into degrees the statute authorized a conviction of any inferior degree of the crime charged, though the
acts proven upon the trial and upon which the verdict was
rendered were not included in those alleged in the indictment. Such construction of the statute would of course alter
the fundamental rule of criminal jurisprudence that the accused need answer only the charge preferred in the indictment. The Court of Appeals in the case of Dedieu v. People 4
expressly denied that the legislature had intended, by dividing certain crimes into degrees, to classify every lesser degree as an inherent part of the greater, so that an indictment
for the higher degree would include a charge upon the lower.
On the contrary, the court carefully pointed out that the division of crimes into different degrees was merely an effort
toward a more discriminating arrangement than existed at
common law, saying: "The idea of distinguishing them numerically as different degrees of a generic offense was simply
a matter of terminology. Their legal character and relations
would have been precisely the same, if an additional set of
names has been invented and attached to the different descriptions of crime." I Therefore, the classification of any
one crime as a lesser degree of another does not thereby include the lesser as one of the offenses charged in an indictment upon the greater. Thus in a trial upon an indictment
N. Y.

CoDE

CRim. PRoc. § 445 provides:

"In all other cases, the defendant may be found guilty of any crime,
the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is
charged in the indictment."
Section 444 was first enacted in slightly different form in Revised Statutes
of 1829 (2 Rav. STAT. 702 § 27).
'22 N. Y. 180 (1860), cited supra note 2.

'Id. at 183.
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charging arson in the first degree committed by the burning
of a dwelling house, a conviction for arson in the third degree
is improper though the evidence proved the defendant had
wilfully burned his goods, with intent to prejudice the insurer, for the elements of the lesser crime were no part of the
greater charged in the indictment. The correct interpretation of the statute is, said the court, "that upon an indictment for an offense consisting of different degrees, the jury
may, in a case in other respects proper, find the accused not
guilty in the degree charged, but guilty in any inferior degree of the same offense. Such finding would be proper,
where the act proved was the identical act set forth in the
indictment, and where all the circumstances descriptive of
the inferior degree, of which the defendant was to be convicted, were also parcels of the offense in the higher degree,
and were contained in the indictment, and such finding would
not be proper in any other case." 6
Despite this clear expression of the function of the statute and its. effect upon the indictment, the belief that the
statute enlarged the common law rule persisted, for the same
court in a subsequent opinion concluded:

"*

* " when the

act for which the accused is indicted is the same for which
he is convicted, the conviction of a lower degree is proper,
although the indictment contains averments constituting the
offense of the highest degree of the species of the crime, and
omits to state the particular intent and circumstances characterizing a lower degree of the same crime" because

'"*

* *

the statute authorizing a conviction of a lower degree of the
same crime, upon an indictment, for a higher degree, makes
the evidence authorizing such conviction, competent." 7 In
'Id. at 185. Said Wright, J., concurring, id. at 187: "The statute should
receive a reasonable construction. Its real meaning is, that upon an indictment
charging an offense of which the statute has prescribed different degrees, the
inferior degrees being generic to the superior, and the indictment containing
enough to apprize the accused of the lesser charge, if the evidence, in the view
of the jury, be insufficient to convict of the greater offense, but sufficient to
convict of an inferior degree of such offense, the jury may find the accused
guilty of the inferior degree, or of an attempt to commit the offense charged."
'Keefe v. People, 40 N. Y. 348, 356 (1869), where it was said: "It is a
general rule in criminal pleading, that when the act done is criminal only when
done under a particular state of facts and circumstances, the existence of such
facts and circumstances must be averred in the indictment but the section of
the statute under consideration has in effect provided that when the indictment
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that case the defendant was held properly convicted of murder in the second degree committed without a design to affect death while engaged in a felony, under an indictment
charging murder in the first degree with malice aforethought.
The same result is now obtained, but for a different reason,
the view no longer being acceptable that the statute authorizing a conviction for a lower degree of the crime charged
has changed the rules of evidence to permit proof of elements
essential to the lower degree but not averred in the, indictment for the greater crime." It is now understood that proof
of the felony is in support of the allegation that the homicide
committed in the course thereof was with malice aforethought for the malice necessary to constitute the felony is
deemed transferred to the ensuing homicide.)
The application of the rule under consideration was further complicated by the enactment that in "all other cases
(i.e., in crimes not consisting of different degrees) the defendant may be found guilty of any crime, the commission of
which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged
in the indictment", 10 for it would seem, and indeed it has
been so argued,"' that this section was not intended to apply
to trials upon crimes consisting of different degrees, so that
in the latter cases, the degree of the crime found need not be
"necessarily included" in the degree charged. This view was
expressly rejected in the case of People V. Miller 2 where it
is for a crime consisting of different degrees and depending upon the intention

of the accused and the circumstances under which the act was committed and
the indictment charges such act to have been committed with the intent and

under the circumstances constituting the highest degree of the crime the defendant may be convicted of any lesser degree, and consequently, when there is a
failure of proof of any part essential to the conviction of a higher degree,
proof may be given of facts constituting a lower degree of the same crime,
although the facts are not charged in the indictment, and the defendant may,
upon such proof, be rightly convicted of the lower crime." See People v.
McDonell, 92 N. Y. 657 (1883), and dissenting opinion by Chase, J., in People
v. Santoro, 229 N. Y. 277, 285, 128 N. E. 234, 237 (1920).
' People v. Santoro, 229 N. Y. 277, 128 N. E. 234 (1920), infra notes
13, 25.
0People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159 (N. Y. 1834), infra note 35. The same

view had already been expressed in People v. Jackson, 3 Hill 92 (N. Y. 1842),
infra notes 1, 2.
' N. Y. CoDE CRim. PRoc. § 445, supra note 3.
'See People v. Connors, 13 Misc. 582, 35 N. Y. Supp. 472 (1895).
- 143 App. Div. 251, 128 N. Y. Supp. 549 (1st Dept. 1911), aff'd, 202 N. Y.

618, 96 N. E. 1125 (1911), infra notes 21, 28.
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was said: "Being merely declaratory of the common law,
these statutes are to be construed as near to the rule and
reason of the common law as may be * * *, and we are not
to limit or lessen their application because, for convenience
of codification, the rule has been stated in two sections instead of one. There is, therefore, no force in the suggestion
that section 445 is applicable only to offenses not divided into degrees; that to such offenses only section 444 is applicable; and that under it a conviction can be had only for the
crime charged or of one of the inferior 'degrees' thereof and
not a misdemeanor consisting of some of the elements going
to make up the crime charged. Such was not the common
law rule in the State, and the statute, as we consider, has not
changed the common law in this regard, and as has been said
the enactment of the rule in statutory form was not designed
to limit its application."
Since the lesser degree of the crime charged upon which
the accused may be convicted must, conformably to the common law rule, consist of no other elements than those contained in the greater, the distinction between crimes consisting of degrees and other crimes is immaterial. In any case,
the crime for which the defendant is convicted must be
"necessarily included" in the crime with which he is charged.
For "one crime is not a lower degree of another crime, unless
the latter crime necessarily includes the ingredients of the
former crime." 13
However, prior to the amendment of the statute in
1900,14 upon an indictment for murder, a refusal to submit
the crime of assault for the jury's consideration was held
proper, not because an assault at common law was a misdemeanor and therefore not convictable upon a felony charge;
but because "a simple assault is not one of the grades of
homicide * * *", meaning that assault is not a statutory degree of murder, and "an assault in any of its degrees, we
think, is not a necessary legal element in a charge of murder",
meaning that murder could be committed -withoutan assault
" People v. Santoro, 229 N. Y. 277, 128 N. E. 234 (1920), supra note 8,
infra note 25. "One crime is not necessarily included in another where they
are substantively and generically separate and disconnected offenses." People
v. Nichols, 230 N. Y. 221, 129 N. E. 883 (1921), infra notes 23, 33, 34.
' Laws of 1900, c. 625, supra note 3.
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which therefor is not "necessarily included" in the charge of
murder. 15
The amendment, attributed to this decision, added the
provision: "Upon a trial for murder or manslaughter, if the
act complained of is not proven to be the cause of death, the
defendant may be convicted of assault in any degree constituted by said act, and warranted by the evidence. A conviction upon a charge of assault is not a bar to a subsequent
prosecution for manslaughter or murder, if the person assaulted dies after the conviction, in case death results from
the injury caused by the assault." 16
The statutes as they now stand, therefore, authorize the
conviction of a defendant accused of a crime only if the crime
for which he is convicted is defined by statute, included in
the charge of the indictment and proven by the evidence.
Hence a study of the application of the sections involved will
require a separate treatment of their effect upon the construction of the indictment, the admissibility of the evidence,
and the instructions to the jury.
THE INDICTMENT.

In New York the indictment 17 may be drawn in the common law form, setting forth the acts alleged to have been
performed by the accused and which constitute the crime
specified,' 8 or in a simplified form charging the crime by
name or by reference to the statute defining the crime. 19
If the indictment alleges the acts constituting the greater
crime charged, every lesser offense constituted by each or
People v. McDonald, 159 N. Y. 309, 54 N. E. 46 (1899). In that case,
however, the homicide was not denied, the defense being justification upon the
claim of self-defense. The same result is now reached upon the theory that
where the homicide is admitted, the defendant is either guilty of the crime or
he must be acquitted, because no view of the evidence would justify the inference that only an assault was committed. Cf. People v. Zielinski, 247 App. Div.
573, 288 N. Y. Supp. 176 (4th Dept. 1936), infra note 20.
" N. Y. Cona Cuss. PRoc. § 444, supra note 3.
' The rules herein treated are equally applicable to trials upon informations. People v. Wein, 190 App. Div. 368, 187 N. Y. Supp. 753 (2d Dept.
1921).
" N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 275, 284, 295a.
" N. Y. CODE Cuss. PROC. § 295 b, c.
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some of the acts is included in the charge. "The correct rule
seems to be that if the allegations of the indictment, relating
to the crime charged, and not relating to the crime found,
can be stricken from the indictment, and still have in the
indictment sufficient allegations of the crime found, then the
judgment of conviction is good, if sufficiently supported by
the evidence." 20 Thus, in an indictment charging burglary
in that the defendant "with force and arms, a certain building, etc., feloniously [and burglariously] did [break into
and] enter, with intent to commit some crime therein, to
wit, with intent the goods, chattels and personal property,
etc., then and there, being, then and there, etc., to steal, take,
carry away, etc." if the words enclosed in brackets are removed, there will be left a sufficient charge of the crime of
unlawful entry, and a conviction therefor may be sustained. 1
An indictment for robbery will include a charge of larceny
22
for there can be no robbery without a larceny.
On an indictment charging the commission of a felony
resulting in a homicide which details the facts and circumstances constituting the felony and the homicide in the course
thereof, the defendant may be convicted of the homicide or
felony, depending upon the evidence offered.2 3 And an indictment for manslaughter while engaged in the commission
of a misdemeanor, which sets forth the acts constituting the
misdemeanor includes the lesser as a crime for which the de24
fendant may be found guilty.
However, an indictment accusing the defendant of manslaughter for an assault by means of a deadly weapon "but
without a design to effect death" does not charge assault in
the first degree "with an intent to kill a human being" for
'People

v. Zielinski, 247 App. Div. 573, 574, 288 N. Y. Supp. 176, 177

(4th Dept. 1936), mtpra note 15.

' People v. Miller, 143 .App. Div. 251, 128 N. Y. Supp. 549 (lst Dept.
1911), aff'd, 202 N. Y. 618, 96 N. E. 1125 (1911), supra note 12, infra note 28.
' People v. Kennedy, 57 Hun 532, 11 N. Y. Supp. 244 (3d Dept. 1890).
rePeople v. Colburn, 162 App. Div. 651, 147 N. Y. Supp. 689 (2d Dept.
1914). The indictment in this case differs from those wherein the felony is
not charged as an offense for which the accused must stand trial but is merely
alleged and proven on the trial to characterize the homicide which is charged.
See People v. Nichols, 230 N. Y. 221, 129 N. E. 883 (1921), mipra note 13, infra
notes 33, 34.
People v. McDonald, 49 Hun 67, 1 N. Y. Supp. 703 (5th Dept. 1888),
supra note 1.
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that intent, essential in assault in the first degree, is no part
of the charge of manslaughter, and a conviction for the assault under such indictment is error.2 5 Nor -may a verdict
of guilty of murder in the second degree be rendered upon an
indictment charging felony murder in that defendant "without a design to affect the death of, etc., while engaged in an
attempt to commit a felony, to wit, rape in the first degree,
etc., did * * * kill and slay, etc.", for the intent necessary to
the crime of murder in the second degree is not averred in. the
indictment. 26 And where the crime of unlawful entry is defined as entry into a building "under circumstances, or in a
manner not amounting to a burglary" with an intent to commit a felony, or a larceny, or malicious mischief, no modification of an indictment charging burglary by a breaking and
entering with an intent "to commit some crime," by striking
out the characteristics of burglary in any of its degrees,
would leave an adequate description of the misdemeanor.2 7
If an indictment, on the other hand, presents the accusation in the simplified form by naming the crime alleged to
have been committed or by specifying the section of the statute violated, every other offense necessarily included in the
crime named is included in the
statutory definition of the
28
indictment.
the
of
charge
. An indictment for murder in the first degree committed
from a deliberate and premeditated design to affect death
may include charges. upon lesser degrees of the homicide ox:
upon the various degrees of assault, as the evidence may indicate. 29 However, a charge of murder committed with a
deliberate and premeditated design to effect death does not
People v. Huson, 114 App. Div. 693, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1081 (4th Dept.
1906), rev'd, 187 N. Y. 97, 79 N. E. 835 (1907) (on the ground no exception
to the charge to the jury had raised a question of law to be reviewed) ; People
v. Santoro, 229 N. Y. 277, 128 N. E. 234 (1920), supra notes 8, 13.
"People v. Hoffman, 219 App. Div. 334, 220 N. Y. Supp. 249 (1st Dept.

1927), aff'd, 245 N. Y. 588, 157 N. E. 869 (1927).
"People v. Meegan, 104 N. Y. 529, 11 N. E. 48 (1887).
'The statute "should be so construed as to require that the lesser offense
for which a conviction might be had must be either included in the statutory
definition of the crime for which the defendant is indicted or included in the
acts set forth in the indictment * * * ". People v. Miller, 143 App. Div. 251,
128 N. Y. Supp. 549 (1st Dept. 1911), aff'd, 202 N. Y. 618, 96 N. E. 1125
(1911), supra notes 12, 21.
'People v. McGloin, 91 N. Y. 241 (1882).
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include a homicide committed in the course of a felony, the
independent felony not being alleged.
In a prosecution for murder by "an act inherently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of
human life, although without a premeditated design to effect
death," 30 a conviction for manslaughter as a result of culpable negligence is proper. 3 1 But, as has been indicated, a
lesser offense is not necessarily included in the greater merely
because it is classified as a lower degree of the same crime.
Thus an indictment in the simplified form for murder, specifying felony murder, does not include any other crime, therefore in such a case the defendant must either be found guilty
as charged or acquitted.3 2 Though the indictment will authorize a conviction of murder for the homicide while defendant was engaged in a felony, the charge does not include
the felony as a crime for which the defendant stands trial
33
and, therefore, no verdict may be rendered upon the felony.
However, an indictment charging murder, in a common
law court, in that defendant "wilfully, feloniously and of
malice aforethought, shot and killed" includes a charge of
murder by homicide in the commission of a felony,3 4 as well
as premeditated murder, where intent to kill is an element,
for "the malicious and premeditated intent to perpetrate one
kind of felony, was, by implication of law, transferred from
such offense to the homicide which was actually committed,
so as to make the latter offense a killing with malice aforethought, contrary to the real fact of the case as it appeared
in the evidence." 35 Such a charge will include manslaughter
I N.

Y. PENAL LAW § 1044, subd. 2.
'People v. Voelker, 220 App. Div. 521, 221 N. Y. Supp. 760 (4th Dept.
1927).
People v. Schleiman, 197 N. Y. 383, 90 N. E. 950 (1910) ; People v.
Chapman, 224 N. Y. 463, 121 N. E. 381 (1918); People v. Smith, 187 N. Y.
Supp. 836 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
'People v. Nichols, 230 N. Y. 221, 129 N. E. 883 (1921), wherein under
an indictment for common law murder evidence of the felony is admitted merely
to characterize the homicide as murder with malice aforethought. The court
distinguished this case from that in which the indictment does charge the felony
as a crime for which a conviction*might be had. See note 13, supra.
People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62 (1884) ; Peonle v. Giblin. 115 N. Y. 196,
21 N. E. 1002 (1889); People v. Schermerhorn, 203 N. Y. 57, 96 N. E. 376
(1911) ; People v. Nichols, 230 N. Y. 221, 129 N. E. 883 (1921); People v.
Lytton, 257 N. Y. 310, 178 N. E. 290 (1931).
'People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159, 174 (N. Y. 1834), supra note 9.
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committed by defendant while engaged in a misdemeanor,3 6
or murder by an act inherently dangerous evincing a de7
praved mind, etc.
And yet upon the trial under an indictment charging
the defendant with the death of A while "engaged in the commission of a felony, to wit: Assault in the first degree upon
the person of * * * B by shooting the said * * * B with a
loaded revolver with intent to kill him" if the evidence indicates that the very assault upon B caused the death of A, the
jury must be permitted to find a verdict upon the lesser degrees of homicide, for the crime proven is not felony murder,
the felony merging in the homicide,3 8 but, the necessary intent having been alleged, may be murder in the second degree
3 9
or manslaughter.

THE EVIDENCE.
Being declaratory of the common law, the statutes under
consideration have not varied the general rules of evidence.
The view, formerly held,"0 that the statute authorizing a conviction for any lesser degree of the crime charged makes the
evidence proving such lesser crime competent though the elements peculiar to the lesser are not averred in the indictment, has been discarded. Though the statute permits a
conviction of assault upon a charge of manslaughter, evidence
of an intent to kill not alleged in the indictment, does not
justify a conviction for assault in the first degree for the
words, "in any degree constituted by said aet, and warranted
by the evidence", 41 are words of limitation; "said act" being
'People v. Darragh, 141 App. Div. 408, 126 N. Y. Supp. 522 (1st Dept.
1910), aff'd, 203 N. Y. 527, 96 N. E. 1124 (1911).
'People v. Jernatowski, 238 N. Y. 188, 144 N. E. 497 (1924).
"In order, therefore, to constitute murder in the first degree by the
unintentional killing of another while engaged in the commission of a felony,
we think that while violence may constitute a part of the homicide, yet the
other elements constituting the felony in which he is engaged must be so distinct from that of the homicide so not to be an ingredient of the homicide,
indictable therewith or convictable thereunder." People v. Hiter, 184 N. Y.
237, 244, 77 N. E. 6 (1906). On this topic see (1936) 10 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.

253.

People v. Van Norman, 231 N. Y. 454, 132 N. E. 147 (1921).

'Keefe
v. People, 40 N. Y. 348 (1869), supra note 7.
' N. Y. CODE CRim. PRoc. § 444, mipra note 3.
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that charged in the indictment and not merely that proven
upon the trial.4
The conviction of a lesser offense is not proper unless
every element constituting the lesser crime is proven by the
evidence. As has been said: 11 "Of course it is not right to
convict a man of a less degree of crime simply because a jury
doubt whether he committed the greater. Manslaughter is
not half-proved murder, but the elements which constitute
that less degree must be themselves proved."
On the other hand, if the evidence proves the crime of a
higher degree it is not proper for the jury to render a verdict
upon a lower offense. The statute does not clothe the jury
with the authority to determine the law, but requires it to
find a verdict upon the evidence. If upon a trial for robbery,
the offense charged is supported by the evidence and the defense interposed is an alibi, the defendant is guilty as charged
or he must be acquitted; a conviction of attempted robbery
must be reversed. 4 Where the undisputed proof shows a
completed burglary, the jury may not consider the offense
of attempted burglary.45 Or where upon a charge of rape,
if the evidence proves the completed crime no verdict may be
rendered upon assault in the first degree with an intent to
commit a felony, for if the jury does not believe rape was
committed, there is no evidence from which it may infer an
assault with an intent to commit a felony. 46 And it has been
said: "* * * one who assaults another with intent to cause
4 People v. Santoro, 229 N. Y. 277, 284, 128 N. E. 234, 237 (1920) ; People
v. Huson, 114 App. Div. 693, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1081 (4th Dept. 1906), reV'd, 187
N. Y. 97, 79 N. E. 835 (1907), supra note 25.
People v. Downs, 56 Hun 5, 11, 8 N. Y. Supp. 521 (3d Dept. 1890),
aff'd, 123 N. Y. 558, 25 N. E. 988 (1890) ; cf. People v. Young, 96 App. Div.
33, 88 N. Y. Supp. 1063 (1st Dept. 1904), where it was said: "The verdict may
not be justified by the evidence but the statute permits the jury to make the
finding, and there is no power in the court to prohibit it." See also dissenting
opinion in People v. Santoro, 229 N. Y. 277, 285, 128 N. E. 234, 237 (1920).
"People v. Blakeman, 34 N. Y. Supp. 262 (Gen. Sess. N. Y. County
1895) ; N. Y. PENAL LAW § 260 providing: "A person may be convicted of an
attempt to commit a crime, although it anpears on the trial that the crime was
consummated, unless the court, in its discretion, discharges the jury and directs
the defendant to be tried for-the crime itself" is applicable only to a trial upon
an indictment for an attempt to commit a crime and not to a trial upon an
indictment for the crime itself. See People v. Bennett, 182 App. Div. 871,
170 N. Y. Supp. 718 (2d Dept. 1918).
• Sullivan v. People, 27 Hun 35 (1st Dept. 1882).
"'People v. Aldrich, 58 Hun 603, 11 N. Y. Supp. 464 (1st Dept. 1890);
People v. Cosad, 1 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 132, - App. Div. - (2d Dept. 1937).
But see People v. Fagan, 163 Misc. 495, 297 N. Y. Supp. 321 (Sup. Ct., Erie
Co. 1937).
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him to be unlawfully confined is not guilty of assault in the
second degree, but of kidnapping." Therefore, if the crime
of kidnapping has been proven no verdict may be rendered
4
upon assault. 7
The jury, though it be the trier of the facts, may not
disregard the evidence, uncontradicted and plausible. In a
prosecution for murder or manslaughter the jury may, if in
other respects proper, consider the crime of assault in various degrees, only where the "act complained of" is not proven
to have caused the homicide charged. If the indictment accuses the defendant of manslaughter in the first degree in
that defendant "wilfully and feloniously did make an assault * * * with a certain knife * * * in and upon the
abdomen * * *",and the defendant denies that he committed
the assault but not that the assault charged was fatal, the
jury must either believe the defendant and acquit or find him
guilty of manslaughter. 48 If an assault in the first degree,
charged to have been committed with a deadly weapon and
with an intent to kill, is proven by the prosecution, the evidence of the accused tending to prove he acted in self-defense
leaves for the jury only the question of the defendant's guilt
of assault in the first degree, and no verdict upon a lesser
degree may be found as there is no denial that if the assault
was not justifiable, it was assault in the first degree. 49 Where
the evidence in support of an indictment charging manslaughter in the first degree for a homicide committed "in a
cruel and unusual manner, or by means of a dangerous
weapon," proves that death was caused by blows inflicted
with an iron poker upon a little girl and the defendant denies having committed the assault, the jury may not find any
other degree of manslaughter or assault, for if the defendant
committed the assault it was manslaughter in the first
degree. 0
'People v. Weiss, 252 App. Div. 463, 300 N. Y. Supp. 249 (2d Dept.
1937),8 rev'd on other grounds, 276 N. Y. 384, 12 N. E. (2d) 514 (1938).
' People v. Schiavi, 96 App. Div. 479, 89 N. Y. Supp. 364 (4th Dept.
1904), appeal dismissed, 180 N. Y. 546, 73 N. E. 1129 (1905); cf. People v.
Wheeler, 79 App. Div. 396, 79 N. Y. Supp. 454 (4th Dept. 1903).
" People v. Dartmore, 48 Hun 321, 2 N. Y. Supp. 310 (2d Dept. 1888).
People v. DeGarmo, 73 App. Div. 46, 76 N. Y. Supp. 477 (4th Dept.
1902), reVad o, other grounds, 179 N. Y. 130, 71 N. E. 736 (1904).
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The conviction of a lesser degree of the crime for which
the defendant is indicted can be proper only if the facts
proven logically justify the verdict.5 It is, therefore, the
province of the trial court to determine before its charge to
the jury what offenses the jury may properly consider in
view of the evidence.

THE INSTRUCTIONS.

The court's charge to the jury in criminal cases must
include instructions upon the various lesser crimes upon
which a verdict may be rendered depending upon the form of
the indictment and the evidence offered under it.
The task placed upon the trial court with reference to
this subject has proven difficult. For not only must the
court accurately construe the indictment to determine what
lesser crimes the indictment includes in its charge but the
court must also weigh the sufficiency of the evidence adduced,
leaving to the jury only such possible verdicts as may be
reasonable in view of the evidence.
Though under an indictment charging murder by malice
aforethought a conviction might be had for a criminal homicide not requiring malice, where the evidence indicates that
the killing was deliberate and intentional, the court may not
give instructions upon the crime of murder committed by
an act inherently dangerous, evincing a depraved mind, etc.,
but without a premeditated design to effect death, for a verdict upon such offense would not be justified by the evidence.52 Upon an indictment for assault in the first degree
by the use of a loaded revolver and with an intent to kill,
the jury must not be permitted to find a verdict on assault
in the third degree, for the facts prove either assault in the
first or second degrees or the defendant is not guilty of any
offense.

53

Felony murder cases present particularly difficult probv. Thompson, 198 N. Y. 396, 91 N. E. 838 (1910).
v. Ludkowitz, 266 N. Y. 233, 194 N. E. 688 (1935).
People v. Randazzo, 127 App. Div. 824, 112 N. Y. Supp. 104 (4th Dept.

'People
'People

1908).
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54
lems for the trial court in its instructions to the jury.
Under an indictment in the simplified form charging murder
in the commission of a felony, the intent with which the
homicide was committed being immaterial, the evidence is
restricted to the proof of the felony and the ensuing homicide.
Hence the court need not submit lesser degrees in its charge
to the jury for no other crime is "necessarily. included" in
that for which the defendant is tried.5 5 Or under an indictment charging murder in the common law court, i.e., with
malice aforethought, though it permit evidence of premeditated murder, if the evidence is restricted to proof of a homicide in the commission of a felony, the court may properly
charge the jury to render a verdict upon the crime of felony
murder only.50 However, under a common law murder
count, if evidence is offered tending to negative the proof of
the felony, the malice inferred from the proof of the felony
may not be such as to characterize the homicide as murder,
but such as to constitute the homicide manslaughter. Thus,
if the defendant offer evidence of his intoxication from which
the jury may infer that the defendant could not have had
the requisite intent to commit the underlying felony, the defendant may nevertheless be guilty of manslaughter while
engaged in a misdemeanor, 57 or while engaged in the commission of a trespass " or other invasion of a private right,
and hence it would be error to refuse to submit these lesser
degrees. 9
Whether or not evidence, sufficient to raise a doubt as to
the defendant's ability to commit the felony, offered upon a
trial under an indictment which charges not common law
murder but felony murder, describing the crime by name
or specifying the section of the statute violated, will require
submission of lower degrees, is open to question. In the case

' See (1937) 6 BROOKLYN L. REv. 455.
'People v. Schlelman, 197 N. Y. 383, 90 N. E. 950 (1910).
'People v. Seiler, 246 N. Y. 262, 158 N. E. 615 (1927) ; People v. Martone, 256 N. Y. 395, 176 N. E. 544 (1931).
. N. Y. PENAL LAw § 1050, subd. 1.
'Id. see § 1052, subd. 1.
'People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 155 N. E. 79 (1926); People v.
Cummings, 274 N. Y. 336, 8 N. E. (2d) 336 (1937); see People v. Sullivan,
274 N. Y. 591, 10 N. E. (2d) 567 (1937).
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of People v. Stevens,6 ° the indictment contained two counts,
one upon common law murder, the other upon felony murder. The prosecution elected to proceed upon the felony
murder count and offered its evidence thereunder. The court
submitted the case to the jury on the felony murder count
only, charging that it must find the defendants guilty of
murder in the first degree or acquit them. The refusal to
submit lesser degrees was held proper despite evidence that
one of the defendants acted under coercion so as not to be
guilty of the underlying felony. The dissenting opinion asserted: "The administration of justice is not so tightly
bound by legalistic formulas that the life or death of an accused may be made dependent upon the manner in which a
charge is formulated in the indictment. Certainly the probative value and the effect of the evidence presented to the jury
cannot be changed by the form of an indictment or by choice
of a District Attorney to have the case submitted to the jury
under one count of an indictment rather than another." 61
Admittedly, where, under a common law murder indictment, the evidence indicates that the felony merged in the
homicide, 6 or was abandoned prior to the homicide,6 3 or
that the defendant, being under sixteen years of age,( 4 was
incapable of committing the felony, 65 the jury may not be
permitted to consider the crime of felony murder, but must
be instructed as*to the other degrees of criminal homicide.
Yet, it would seem, if the indictment charges felony murder
only by name or by specifying the section of the statute violated, the defendant is not charged with any other crime,
and therefore, if the evidence fails to establish the felony and
the ensuing homicide, the defendant should be acquitted. 6
- 272 N. Y. 373, 6 N. E. .(2d) 60 (1936).
People v. Stevens, 272 N. Y. 373, 381, 6 N. E. (2d) 60, 63 (1936).
'People v. Hiter, 184 N. Y. 237, 177 N. E. 6 (1906); People v. Lazar,
271 N. Y. 27, 2 N. E. (2d) 32 (1936).
People v. Smith, 232 N. Y. 239, 133 N. E. 574 (1921); People v. Walsh,
262 N. Y. 140, 186 N. E. 422 (1933).
6
1N. Y. PENAL LAW § 2186.
People v. Roper, 259 N. Y. 170, 181 N. E. 88 (1932).
' The statement in People v. Schleiman, 197 N. Y. 383, 390, 90 N. E. 950,
953 (1910) : "The conditions are exceptional, however, which warrant a refusal
to instruct the jury as to their power to convict of a lower degree of the crime
charged for which the defendant is upon trial and great care should be observed,
as was done here, not to withhold such instruction unless the case is one like
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That the form of the indictment should affect the right
of the jury to consider lesser degrees, is, as we have seen, not
a "mere legalistic formula", for the indictment serves to inform the accused of the charges preferred against him, the
general scope of the evidence which may be offered in support
of the indictment, and therefore the various lesser crimes for
which he may be convicted. Any other view would deviate
from the conclusion that the statutes in New York authorizing
convictions for other crimes than those specified in the indictment have adopted the rule of the common law.
G. ROBERT ELLGAARD.

Instructor in Law,
St. John's University School of Law.

that before us, where there was no possible view of the facts which would
justify any other verdict except a conviction of the crime charged or an
acquittal," must be read in connection with the form of the indictment in that
case which contained a common law murder count. Cf. People v. Kropowitz,
271 N. Y. 505, 2 N. E. (2d) 668 (1936).

